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A Gradient-Type Algorithm for 
the Numerical Solution of Two-Player 
Zero-Sum Differential Game Problems 
JAROSLAV DOLEŽAL 
A computational method for the determination of open-loop saddle-point strategies for 
a broad class of two-player zero-sum differential games is suggested. In this way the often used 
numerical approach to the numerical treatment of optimal control problems is extended to deal 
to with deal differential game problems involving control and/or final-state constraints. To illustrate 
the practical importance of the algorithm several concrete examples of differential games are 
solved in detail. The existing results in this area are also briefly reviewed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to show that the gradient-type algorithm of the author [1] 
for optimal control problems can be successfully applied when seeking for open-
loop saddle-point strategies of two-player zero-sum differential games. Such possi-
bility was briefly reported about in [2] and some additional results are to be found 
in [3]. As the algorithm of [1] is of rather general nature, it was in the meantime 
also successfully applied to the numerical solution of two-player zero-sum differential 
games with parameters [4 — 5] and general iV-player nonzero-sum differential 
games [6]. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section a brief historical review 
of some of the existing results concerning two-player zero-sum differential games 
is presented. Similar review for the nonzero-sum case is given in [6]. In this way the 
reader can obtain brief information about developments in the field of differential 
games, one of the most important and attractive area of applied mathematics in the 
last decade. Special attention will be paid to the numerical solution of differential 
game problems, because this is in a very close connection with practical applications 
of the differential game theory. 
The following section is then devoted to the precise formulation of a differential 
game problem containing the constraints on controls and final state. The concept 
of a saddle-point solution is introduced and necessary optimality conditions are 
briefly discussed. 
The fourth section contains the derivation of a gradient method based upon the 
perturbations of linearized form of the original problem. The alternative derivation 
of necessary optimality conditions is obtained in this way. Then the numerical algo-
rithm is summarized and some aspects of its computer implementation are discussed. 
Finally, several concrete examples of two-player zero-sum differential games are 
solved in detail and the computational experience with the suggested algorithm is 
reported. The obtained results confirm the practical applicability of the algorithm 
when solving differential game problems. 
2. A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY 
The subject of differential games is relatively new area of applied mathematics. 
It is closely related to the theory of optimal control, which is, in fact, a trivial one-
-player game. The overall interest in this subject is dated by the appearence of the 
classical Isaacs monograph [7] in 1965, although there has been some activity in 
this field before. However, not on a such large scale as after the Isaac's book. 
Differential game is mathematical denotation of a conflicting situation which 
evolves continuously in time. If in the conflict participate only two individuals with 
strictly antagonistic aims, one speaks about the so-called two-player zero-sum dif-
ferential game. The first period of the development of differential game theory is 
represented by the names of Pontrjagin, Berkovitz, Psenicnyj, e.g., see [8 — 11]. The 
effort of many other contributors culminated in [12], where various aspects Of dif-
ferential game theory are studied. In the same time several books have appeared 
giving rigorous and comprehensive treatment of this subject. Let us mention at least 
the geometric approach of Blaquiere et al. [13], the extremum construction of 
Krasovskij [14] or the approximate construction of Friedman [15] based on the 
so-called upper and lower game. 
At this time also various special problems connected with differential games were 
studied. The existence of saddle-point solutions is treated by Varaiya and Lin [16], 
Friedman [15] and later by Elliott et al. [17] and Parthasarathy and Raghavan [18], 
where also the case of the so-called relaxed (mixed) strategies was considered. Mixed 
strategy solutions for quadratic games are explicitly given by Wilson [19]. 
It is not possible to mention all important results and contributors in this area due 
to the limited space. Therefore let us close this part of the survey by mentioning 
several books [20 — 23], mostly conference proceedings, where the interested reader 
can find a lot of supplementary material and further references. Here let us only point 
out the papers [24 -26] , where concrete cases of simple pursuit-evasion games are 
studied and analytical solutions are given. As up-to-date the most general treatment 
of "feedback" differential games it is necessary to mention the book of Krasovskij 
and Subbotin [27], where various problems of differential games are studied in detail. 
Now let us finally discuss some papers dealing with a numerical solution of two-
player zero-sum differential games. As we shall see in the following section, the 
necessary optimality conditions for a saddle-point solution result, in general, into 
a nonlinear two-point boundary-value problem, and thus iterative numerical tech-
niques must be applied. Only in the case of linear dynamics and quadratic cost 
functional it is possible, similarly as in optimal control, to deduce the analytical 
feedback control law for both participating players [28 -29 ] . 
A brief survey of some numerical techniques for differentia] games is due to Tabac 
[30], however several important works are not included. Seemingly the first con-
ceptual algorithm for the numerical iterative solution of general differential games is 
due Starr [31]. It is based upon the perturbations of necessary optimality conditions. 
In [32] the Newton-Raphson and gradient algorithms are constructed to solve zero-
sum differential games with nonlinear dynamics and quadratic cost functional. On the 
other hand, in [33] the general complex cost functional is decomposed into simpler 
functionals together with a special search technique applied to determine saddle-
-points. 
Alternative approach has been explored also by the author applying the idea of 
differential dynamic programming and a first-order and second-order algorithms 
has been worked out in [34]. For the possible application of other techniques, such 
as quasilinearization, penalty methods, or gradient-restoration approach, etc., see 
[35 — 39]. The practically important problem of computing the so-called closed-loop 
strategies (functions of time and state) is studied by Anderson [40 — 41] applying 
the method of neighbouring extremals and Jarmark [42] using the differential dynam-
ic programming approach. 
The first-order gradient algorithm presented in this paper can be regarded as the 
extension of the previous author's work [2]. Conceptually is this simple algorithm 
related to [31, 32, 39]. It enables also the additional treatment of various constraints 
similarly as the algorithms in [35, 38], which are of more complicated nature. 
In principal, any numerical method for optimal control problems can be extended 
to handle also differential game problems. Similarly as in optimal control it is not 
possible to develop a universal method due to fairly large variety of problems 
leading to differential games. Usually it is advisable to try more methods in the case 
of difficulty to exclude a possible dependence of solutions on the particular method. 
3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
In this section let us give the precise formulation of a two-player zero-sum dif-
ferential game. For the sake of simplicity the matrix notation will be used throughout 
the paper. It is assumed that all considered vectors are column-vectors except of gra-
dients of various functions, which are always treated as row-vectors. All further 
defined functions are supposed to be continuously differentiable. As E" will be 
denoted an n-dimensional Euclidean space. To simplify further considerations only 
the problems with fixed final time will be studied, i.e., without any loss of generality 
it is then assumed, that the independent variable (time) t e [0, 1]. The case of free 
final time, e.g., the pursuit-evasion differential games, can be treated analogously as 
in optimal control. Some details in this respect can be found in [2 — 3]. 
As two-player zero-sum differential game is denoted a dynamic situation evolving 
in time, which is influenced by two individuals with strictly conflicting aims. 
More exactly, consider a dynamic system described by a vector differential equation 
and initial conditions 
(1) x = f(x, u, v, t) , x(0) = x0, te [ 0 , 1 ] , 
subject to the final-state constraints 
(2) [>(*)], = 0 
and the control constraints 
(3) u(t) e U c Em , v(t) eVc Em2 , t e [0 ,1] . 
The cost functional is given as 
(4) J = [<?(*)]! + f L(x, u, v, t) df. 
In these equations, x(t) e E" denotes the state vector, u(t) e £"" is the control vector 
of the minimizing player (denoted P), and v(t) e £m2 is the control vector of the 
maximizing player (denoted £). The various functions are defined as follows: 
(5) / : £" x £"" x Em2 x E1 -> £" , ij/ : E" -+ E" , 
L:En x £"" x Emi x E1 - £ x , <p : £" -> £* , 
and index 1 denotes the evaluation of the corresponding expressions at t = 1. 
The aim of player P is to choose a control u to minimize J, whereas the aim of 
player £ is strictly antagonistic, i.e., to maximize J. As an admissible strategy pair 
(u, v) is denoted a pair of piecewise-continuous vector functions u(t), v(t), t e [0, 1], 
not violating the constraints (3), and such that the resulting state trajectory according 
to (1) is a unique absolutely continuous function satisfying the final-state constraints 
(2) at t = 1. In this respect one can speak about the open-loop strategies, because 
the controls of both players are only the functions of t. 
The solution of the differential game (1) —(4) is the well-known saddle-point, i.e., 
such admissible strategy pair (u°, v°) for which 
(6) J(u°, v) = J(u°, v°) = J(u, v°) 
for any u and v constituting the admissible pairs (u,v°) and (u°, v), respectively. Note 
that the inequalities (6) state that if E plays non-optimaly, P can reduce the cost 
functional J still playing u°, while if P plays non-optimaly, E can increase J by 
playing v°. 
Now let us assume the existence of a saddle-point, the so-called "solution in small", 
i.e. no barriers or other possible singular surfaces are encountered. For the sufficient 
existence conditions see [15-18] . Then the necessary optimality conditions for 
a saddle-point solution can be applied, see [9, 13]. First, let us neglect for a moment 
the constraints (3). 
Applying the calculus of variations it is not very hard to show that if (u°, v°) is 
a saddle-point of the differential game given by (1) —(2) and (4), then there exist 
multipliers X(t) e E", t e [0, 1], and v e P such that (symbol T denotes transposition 
and subscripts stand for the corresponding partial derivatives) 
(7) 1 = -fxX-L
T
X, r e [ 0 , 1 ] , 
(8) \X - <pTx - ^ v ] 1 ; = 0', 
(9) fTuX + L
T
U = 0 , t e [0 , 1] , 
(10) fX + LTV = 0 , t e [0, 1] . 
In these relations all functions (arguments omitted for the sake of simplicity) are to 
be evaluated along the saddle-point solution (u°, v°) and the corresponding saddle-
-point trajectory x°. Observe that (7) —(8) together with ( l ) - (2 ) define the unknown 
multipliers X(t) and v, while (9) —(10) give the so-called saddle-point conditions. 
On combining (1) —(2) and (7) —(10) one easily concludes that, in principle, a non-
linear two-point boundary-value problem for the system of In differential equations 
has to be solved. As it is well-known, such problem cannot be generally solved in an 
analytical way, and therefore some iterative numerical techniques must be applied, 
e.g. see [43] in this respect. This approach is then denoted as an indirect one, based 
upon the application of necessary optimality conditions and excluding u and v 
according to (9) and (10), respectively. 
Tf the constraints (3) are present the equations (9) —(10) have the form 
(11) H(u°, v°) = min H(u, v°) = max H(u°, v), te [0, 1] , 
ueV ueV 
where 
(12) H(u,v) = L(x, u, v, t) + XTj(x, u, v, t), t e [0, 1] . 
Constraints (3) will be incorporated into the numerical procedure using the idea 
of projection (clipping-off technique) [44]. It should be also noted that the constraints 
(3) can be generally time-dependent, i.e. to be of the form U(t), V(t), t e [0, 1], 
where U and Fare now the set-valued functions in £"" and Emi, respectively. 
( I 3> * - U ' • ' - & ' • 
4. DERIVATION OF THE ALGORITHM 
As in optimal control the basis for the further described gradient algorithm is the 
selection of a suitable nominal strategy pair (u, v) together with a procedure for the 
appropriate modification of this nominal solution estimate to obtain an improved 
value of the cost functional J, and in the same time, to achieve a better satisfaction 
of constraints (2) —(3). 
As 'the constraints (3) will be treated directly applying the projection, let us neglect 
them when deriving the basic algorithm. Here presented derivation is based upon the 
perturbations of linearized necessary saddle-point conditions. In optimal control 
a similar approach is described in [45]. Alternatively also the approach based upon 
the application of variational methods [46] is possible, e.g. see [2 — 3]. 
To simplify further considerations let us exclude the integral part of the original 
cost functional (4) introducing the additional state variable x"+1. In an obvious way 
the following equations are obtained: 
" ' - C D ' 
}j/ = \jj . (f> = (p + x"+1 . 
Then (1), (2) and (4) change to 
(14) x = f(x, u, v, t), Jc(0) = x0 , 16 [0 ,1] , 
(is) ri(*)L-=o, 
(16) J = [<?(*)], • 
Now assume nominal strategies u and v constituting a nominal saddle-point 
solution estimate (u, v) and the corresponding trajectory x according to (14). Further 
let Au and Av be strategy changes and suppose that the updated strategies u + Au 
and v + Av produce an updated trajectory x + Ax such that the following lineariza-
tion of (14) is satisfied: 
(17) Ax = / , Ax + fu Au +fvAv, Ax(0) = 0 , t e [0, 1] . 
All here and further introduced expressions are to be evaluated at x, u, v. The re-
sulting first order change of (16) due to Au and/or Av can be expressed as 
(18) A3 = {<p(x + .4*)]. - [<?>(*)], = [<h Ax] . 
First let us study only the effect of the strategy change Au of player P, i.e. assume 
Av = 0. It is the well-known fact that the solution of (17) is then given by the formula 
(19) [Ax]^Cx(t)JuAu(t)dt, 
where the (n + 1) x (n + l)-dimensional matrix X(t) satisfies the matrix differential 43S 
equation 
(20) i = - X / ; , 1(1) = / , lie [ 0 , 1 ] , 
with / the appropriate unit matrix. Then 
(21) AJP=[ Ju(t)Au(t)dt, 
where 
(22) Ju(t) - [ 0 J . _?(.)/„ = # ( . ) / „ , f e [0, 1] . 
Clearly pP(t) satisfies the (n + l)-dimensional differential equation 
(23) pP - - / J f c , , fc,(l) = [ # ] , f e [0, 1] . 
Now let us derive the expression for the change [/dt/'p]! of [$(*)]! due to Au. 
Using the same arguments as above, it can be shown that 
(24) lAh]i-[iJt)Mt)dt, 
where 
(25) Ht) = RVL, te [0 ,1] , 
and RP(t) satisfies the ((n + 1) x ^-dimensional differential equation 
(26) KP = -J
TRP , RP(l) = [$TJ. , f e [0, 1] . 
On the other hand, if the effect of Av for Au = 0 is studied, one can easily realize, 
having in mind the maximization of (16), that only the final condition in (23) will 
have the reversed sign, i.e. the following expressions are valid for player E: 
(27) AJE = Cjv(t) Av(t) df = Cp
T
E(t)Jv Av(t) df, 
where 
(28) pE = -flPE , PE(1) = - [ C h , 16 [0 ,1] , 
and 
(29) [A$E-\. = f Ut) - 4 0 dt = f R/t) Jv Av(t) df, 
where 
(30) RE=-J
TA, Ul) = [ & , <e[0,l]. 
436 Composirig now (23) with (28) and (26) with (30), it is obtained that 
(31) PP(t) = ~PE(t) =p(t), *6 [0,1], 
RP(t) = RE(t) = R(t), te [0,1] . 
Having in mind the definition (13) one easily obtains that the last component of 
p(t) is equal to 1 and the last row of R(t) is zero. Then in terms of the original for-
mulation (4) we have 
(32) AJP = I Ju(t) Au(t) dt = J (p
T(t)fu + Lu) Au(t) dt, 
Jo Jo 
AJE = J Jv(t) Av(t) dt = | (-p
T(t)fv - Lv) Av(t) dt, 
Jo Jo 
(33) : [«#,],. = \\u(t)Au(t)dt = f R
T(t) fu Au(t) dt, 
Jo Jo 
[ # J i = [\v(t)Av(t)dt = f R
T(t)fvAv(t)dt, 
Jo Jo 
where the n-vector p(t) and (n x q)-matrix R(t) are given by the relations 
(34) p = -flp - LTX , p(l) = M i . t e [0, 1] , 
R= -fTxR, R(l) = [ ^ ] 1 , te[0,l]. 
Alternatively, p(t) and R(t) are denoted as the influence functions. 
Consider now the augmented cost functional 
(35) j=/ + v ^ ( x ) ] 1 , 
where v e Eq is a constant vector of multipliers. It follows from (32)-(33) that 
(36) h(t) = Ju(t) + vim, te[0,l], 
Jii)=J£i) + vlUt)> te[o,i]. 
Then clearly the choices 
(37) Au(t) = - WP(t) Jl(t) = - WKO (L„ + (p + RvP)
r/u)
r , t e [0, 1] , 
Av(t) = - Wi(0 #(*) = WE(t) (Lv + (p- RvE)
Tfv)
T , 16 [0,1] , 
will guarantee the desired changes of J for both players. Here WP(t) and W f̂) are 
positive definite matrices having the dimensions (m± x mx) and (m2 x m2), respec-
tively. Then we have , in fact, 
(38) AJP < 0, AJҒ > 0 . 437 
This is of course valid for sufficiently small changes Au{t) and Av(t). 
Substituting Au(t), Av(t) from (37) into (32) and (33), we find that 
(39) V D = 
VЈБ = 
(iurHWpí* +(>«)*). 
vur1 «EL + (w. 
and the predicted changes finally are 
(40) àJr= -{ , - l%Vr) , 
ЛJE = -(I JJ ІJФVE) • 
In these relations the following shorthand notation is used (dimensions are obvious 

















(pTfv + Lv) WEf
TR d í , 
0 







1 I r — 
f (pTfv + Q WE(fJp + L\) dt. 
It is assumed that the inversions indicated in (39) exist. 
If the optimum is approached, it follows from (37) that 
(42) Lu + (p + RvrŢfu -* 0 , ř є [ 0 , 1] , 
Lv + (p- RvE)
тfv -> 0 , t є [0, 1] , 
which is in agreement with the optimality conditions (9) —(10). 
, The weighting matrices WP(t) and WE(t) in (37) should be chosen in such manner to 
obtain the approximate agreement of actual and predicted changes in J and \j/ 
438 according to (32) and (33). In fact, the values [Aipplj^ and [Ail/E~\t in (33) are to be 
selected to achieve the better final-state constraints satisfaction, e.g., one can put 
(43) [ . # , ] . = - a - l X x ) ] , , 0 g e, <i 1 , ' 
[<#£,! = - « , W x ) ] 1 ( O g f i ^ l . 
It should be also noted, that letting e, — eE = 0 in (43), the relations (39) then 
correspond to those of [45]. However, in the further summarized algorithm such 
choice usually leads to a slower final-state constraints satisfaction, as it was con-
firmed by practical computations. 
As stopping conditions we can require (see (39) —(40) with [_A^P~\t = [ ^ J i = 0) 
[*(*)]. « 0 , 
(44) ipjj-i%{iUYl{i%Y-o, 
hj ~ * .w/w VJ*) ~ 0 
with the desired accuracy. 
If the strategy constraints (3) are present, the new solution estimates 
(45) u{t) = u{t) + Au{t), 16 [0 ,1] , 
v{t) = i>(0 + Av{t), 16 [0, 1] , 
are always checked if they meet these constraints. This not being the case, the fol-
lowing projection is performed, e.g., see [44, p. 263], according to formulas 
(46) u{t) & proj [«(f) | U] , te [ 0 , 1 ] , 
v(t) = proj [_v{t) | V ] , t e [0, 1] , 
where for y0 e E
r and 2 c £ ' we define 
(47) proj [y0 | Q] = arg min [fly - y 0 | | y e Q~\ , 
i.e., under the projection of a point y0 we understand its nearest point y e Q. 
It should be noted at this place that such projection is sometimes troublesome to 
perform analytically in spite of its simple geometric interpretation. The existence of 
this projection is guarranted if the set Q is compact. If Q is moreover strictly convex, 
the projection will be unique. However, in a number of practical cases, where the 
constraining sets in (3) are given as parallelepipeds, spheres, elipsoids, etc., the desired 
projection is easily performed. Observe that this reasoning will be valid if the sets U(t) 
and V{t) vary with t and have a piecewise-continuous boundary. 
In this case the stopping conditions (44) must be modified in the following way. 
We consider only the "feasible" changes Au{t) and Av{t), i.e., such portions of Au{t) 
and Av(t) given by (37), that the new solution estimates (45) satisfy the constraints 
(3). Then instead of (44) we use 
(48) gP = ?Au
T(t) WP\t) Au(t) df, 
gB= I Av
T(t) WE\t)Av(t)dt. 
It can be shown that if no constraints (3) are present the conditions (48) are identical 
with those given by (44). 
5. SUMMARY OF THE ALGORITHM 
In the section let us summarize the computational steps of the just derived first-
order gradient algorithm for differential game problems (1) —(4). The resulting algo-
rithm consists of the following steps. 
Step 1. Select a nominal feasible saddle-point estimate (u, v), i.e., functions u(t) 
and v(t), t e [0, 1], not violating the constraints (3). 
Step 2. Using this estimate integrate the system equations (1) in the sense of the 
increasing time (forward run) with the specified initial condition x0. Record the time-
histories x(t), u(t) and v(t), t e [0, 1], and the values [ p j j . , [«A]i, [<AJi-
Step 3. Integrating in the sense of the decreasing time (backward run) determine 
n-dimensional function p(t) and (n x g)-dimensional function R(t), t e [0, 1] ac-
cording to formulas (34). 
Step 4. Compute the expressions given by the relations (41). 
Step 5. Select \_A^iP~\i and [^iK]i according to (43) by an appropriate choice of eP 
and eE, and compute vP and vE from the relations (39). 
Step 6. Update the existing solution estimates u(t) and v(t) by adding the corrections 
Au(t) and Av(t), according to (37) so that (45) is obtained. 
Step 7. Check, if the resulting new solution estimates (45) satisfy the constraints (3). 
This not being the case, perform the projection as indicated in relations (46). 
Step 8. Using the projected values compute the feasible changes Au(t) and Av(t), 
t e [0, 1], and evaluate relations gP and gE given by (48). If gE < e, gP < e, and 
[jr,]. < 5, where e and <5 are the permitted errors in optimality conditions and 
final-state constraints, respectively, then stop the computations; else go to Step 2. 
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In practical realization of the algorithm the appropriate weighting matrices 
WP(t) and WE(t), t e [0, 1], and the constants BP and BE are usually selected only ir) 
the first iteration of the algorithm and these values are used throughout the remaining 
computational process. Practical experience has further shown that the mentioned, 
weighting matrices can be chosen constant. 
Alternatively, the stopping condition (48) can be replaced on considering the 
actual changes in the cost functional J. If its changes produced by the algorithm are 
satisfactorily small, then the computations are stopped. Let us also remark that, in 
general, it is advisable, similarly as in optimal control theory to try various nominal 
solution estimates to decrease the possibility of obtaining only a "local" saddle*-
-point. 
6. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 
The practical importance of the presented algorithm is illustrated by the solution 
of several concrete examples of two-player zero-sum differential games. All examples 
were solved using the SIMFOR simulation program of Cerny [47] in the connection 
with EAI PACER 600 hybrid computer (digital part) installed at the Institute of 
Information Theory and Automation. This interactive simulation program for the 
solution of two-point boundary-value problems simplifies to a great extent the realiza-
tion of many numerical methods for dynamic optimization. Moreover, this program 
saves a lot of routine programmer's work and enables a direct use of the who|e 
EAI PACER 600 computer system. 
Through this section all variables are scalars. As stopping criteria the values e = 
= 10~10 and 8 = 10~6 (if necessary) are used. Let us also note that all figures are 
the direct prints of the computer display using the Hard Copy Unit. All integrations 
were performed using the 3rd order variable step Runge-Kutta method with the overall 
permitted error emax = 10~
4. Definite integrals were evaluated using the Simpson's 
rule. . 
The further reported convergence results (weights WP, WE, constants BP, EE) pertain 
to the normalized formulation (1) — (4) having t e [0, 1]. If the problem has te 
t e [f0, t/\, one performs the evident time-scale transformation 
(49) «' = L^°-
tS — 'o 
to have t' e [0 ,1] . This transformation is not explicitely mentioned in the sequel. 
The given convergence results are those obtained for the nominal solution estimate 
u(t) = v(t) = 0, t e [f0, tf]. The corresponding weighting matrices WP(i) and fiE(i) 
are assumed to be constant for t e [i0, t/\. 
For all examples the most important data are collected in Table 1. The meaning 
of all symbols is obvious, only N stands for the number of iterations needed for 
convergence, tf denotes the final time and J° are the optimal costs.. 
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Example 1. Consider a simple example of a linear-quadratic differential game. 
Given the system equations 
(50) 
* ! = 
X2 = 
x t + ax2 + v, x,(0) = 2 0 , 
0-5x! + 0-5x2 + V5u , x2(0) = 2-0, 
and the cost functional 
(51) J = i[x2 + x2]0.9 + i 
0,9 
(u2 - v2) dt , 
0 
Fig. 1. Optimal solution of Example 1. 
i.e., t e [0, 0-9]. Further let a = -1-3657 as in [ 4 - 5 ] , where the problem of the 
additional parameter optimization by the minimizing player was studied. For this 
value of parameter a, which is optimal for the minimizing player, the data concerning 
the convergence are summarized in Table 1 and the optimal solution (saddle-point 
strategies u°(t), v°(t) and the corresponding state trajectory x°(t)) is shown in Fig. 1. 
In this simple case it is possible to obtain the saddle-point strategies also in a "feed-
back" form when solving the corresponding Riccati-like equations by backward 
integration, e.g., see [28-29]. In fact, a linear two-point boundary-value problem 
is to be solved. Then clearly a considerably less computational effort will be needed 
in comparison with the iterative procedure of this first-order algorithm. The example 
was included here to illustrate the principal possibility to solve this class of problems. 
442 However, the main importance of the algorithm is in its applicability for nonlinear 
problem or problems with various constraints. For example, if in this example certain 
control constraints are assumed, the mentioned direct solution via the Riccati equa­
tion is no more possible. 
Table 1. Summary of the convergence results for the illustrative examples. 
.7° *?('/> *2<V лr Wr *E 
Example 1 1-4838 -0-31143 0-76331 26 0-3 0-5 
Example 2 0-54896 0-57774 -0-30865 36 0-47 0-45 
Example 3 0-96897 0-65257 -0-67400 29 0-5 0-5 
Example 4 0-97166 0-63882 -0-71527 30 0-5 0-5 
Example 5 0-99885 0-60374 -0-89626 13 10 0-5 
Example 2. Consider the system dynamics representing the Van der Pol oscillator 
(52) *, = x 2 , x t(0) = 0-0, 
x 2 = - x . + u - v + (1 - Xi) x 2 , x2(0) = 1-0 , 
and the cost functional 
(53) J = i [ x 2 ] i . 5 + i J (0-5u
2 - 2-Or2) dt, 
i.e., t e [0, 1-5]. The obtained results are given in Table 1 and Fig. 2. It can be seen 
that a very good agreement with the results of [32] is reached. 
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Fig. 2. Optimal solution of Example 2. Fig. 3. Optimal solution of Example 3. 
Example 3. Consider the system (52) with the reversed initial condition and 443 
. 6 [0 ,1] : 
(54) xt -. x 2 , x.(0) = 1-0, 
x2 = - x . + M - c + (1 - x
2) x2 , x2(0) = 0-0 , 
and the integral cost functional 
(55) 3 = i (x2 + x\ + 0-25w2 - t;2) d í . 
The optimal solution is depicted in Fig. 3. However, see also Table 1 for further 
details. 
Example 4. In addition to (54) —(55) assume the strategy constraints 
(56) |«(r)| = 0-5 , \v{i)\ = 0-15 , t e [0 ,1] . 
These constraints were treated applying the described projection technique. For the 
optimal solution in this case see Fig. 4 and Table 1. 
Example 5. Consider once more (54) —(55) and the additional final-state constraint 
(57) [x. - x2 - 1-5L = 0 . 
Also this problem was solved rather easily using the described algorithm with 
sp = EE = 0-5 to achieve faster constraint satisfaction. The obtained optimal solution 
is shown in Fig. 5 and described again in Table 1. For optimal solution we had 
vP = —0-41126 and vE = 0-53544. Let us note, that in this example the optimal 
Fig. 4. Optimal solution of Example 4. Fig. 5. Optimal solution of Example 5. 
444 solution slightly varied with a concrete computational process, i.e., practically 
unimportant dependence on the choice of WP, WE, aP and zE was observed. This cir* 
cumstance can be probably explained by the "equilibrium" in satisfaction of the 
saddle-point conditions (9) —(10) and the final-state constraints (2) included using1 
the multiplier v. Within the given accuracy it is not further possible to distinguish the 
exact optimum. 
In all examples the various nominal solution estimates were tested, all leading to 
the same final results. Also the additional tests were perform to be sure that 4.1^ 
converged solutions are really saddle-point, e.g., by small perturbations of the Con-
verged strategies u°(t), and v°(t) in the .connection with condition (6), ,,,, 
To the overall characteristics of the presented examples let us remark that the. 
optimal costs J° in Table 1 were usually reached in a smaller number of iterations 
than needed for convergence. This shows that the saddle-point solutions are rather 
flat and that the prescribed accuracy is sufficient to obtain meaningful results. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
A first-order gradient algorithm was developed for a broad class of nonlinear 
two-player zero-sum differential game problems invoking strategy and final-state 
constraints. The derivation of this algorithm based on a linearization of the original 
differential game and introduction of the so-called influence functions. The strategy 
constraints are treated directly applying the idea of projection, while the final-state 
constraints are incorporated indirectly using multipliers. 
The practical experience with the suggested algorithm is reported and several 
concrete examples of two-player nonzero-sum differential games are solved in detail 
to illustrate various computational aspects of this numerical procedure. The main 
advantage is its simple form, which is easy to realize especially in the connection 
with the existing interactive simulation program SIMFOR described in [47]. I 
(Received June 29, 197$.) 
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